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 Sun Tzu, Nuclear Weapons and China's Grand Strategy 
by James Rickard 
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a 
road either to safety or to ruin.[1]  
Introduction: Outside Influences on Developments in China's Military  
Nuclear weapons served as the centerpiece of superpower Cold War military deterrent strategies 
since they burst on the scene in the last century. To the credit of the five charter members of the 
slowly-growing "Nuclear Club" (NC), or the "nuclear weapon State Parties" as they are identified 
in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),[2] no in bello use of such 
weapons has occurred since the Empire of Japan experienced their effects in August 1945. 
Nuclear tests, however, were subsequently conducted by the Soviet Union (1949), the United 
Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964), and were later followed by India, Pakistan, 
Israel (although evidence has not been verified), and most recently by North Korea. It is 
incumbent upon each NC member-country to develop its own strategy for safeguarding, 
deploying, and using the weapons in its respective nuclear arsenal. The use of nuclear weapons 
in a conflict today could cause millions of deaths and untold billions of dollars in material and 
property losses. Hence, international regimes, such as the NPT, have been established to curtail 
the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to any non–nuclear weapon state. With the demise of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, U.S attention shifted focus to China as the 
emerging power in Asia, and to the trajectory of China's nuclear weapons program.[3] This paper 
is not an historical review of China's nuclear weapons program. It is an attempt to provide a view 
into its future by suggesting answers to the question of: What is the Role of Nuclear Weapons in 
China's grand strategy? The paper will also discuss how the ancient writings of Sun Tzu have 
informed China's current strategy.  
Much has been written on how the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons have actually succeeded 
in preventing a post-WW II nuclear exchange. NC members continue to include these weapons 
as vital elements in their overall grand military strategies. The perceived deterrent effects gained 
from the possession of nuclear weapons can also be "extended" to NC members' allies by means 
of security agreements (e.g., the promise to defend a non-nuclear ally against attack by a NC 
member). Also, to assuage the urge for non-nuclear states to join the 'club,' NC members such as 
China, for example, may publicly pledge, as it did in the white paper titled "China's National 
Defense in 2006" (White Paper), not to use nuclear weapons against non-NC members (a 
negative security assurance). China made an additional pledge of No First Use (NFU).[4, 5]  
One reads of national nuclear strategies, such as the U.S.' Single Integrated Operations Plan 
(SIOP), which are highly classified and only individuals requiring access and possessing a need-
to-know are aware of the target sets and strike options contained therein. It is self evident that 
such information be kept from the ken of potential adversaries. Does one ever read about an 
equivalent Chinese 'SIOP'? One thinks not. Additionally, China's nuclear declaratory policy and 
its actual employment strategy may not necessarily overlap during a real-world contingency, or 
when in extremis. Deeds may belie words. This controversial topic will be discussed later in the 
paper.  
Concomitantly, concerning the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese grand strategy, Ronald N. 
Montaperto wrote:  
 . . . it is not in China's strategic interest to be transparent about most aspects of its 
nuclear posture and strategy. No amount of strategic dialogue is likely to be sufficient by 
itself to overcome Beijing's incentives to remain as opaque as possible. This is likely to 
be a major issue in future development of bilateral relations.[6]  
The White Paper places the command and control of nuclear weapons and employment 
strategies in the hands of chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).[7, 8] Therefore, if is inferred that nuclear strategy formulation, and when 
necessary, execution orders, will be directed by the CMC.[9] The White Paper clearly stated: 
"China's nuclear strategy is subject to the state's nuclear policy and military strategy. Its 
fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons 
against China."[10]  
Secrecy as well as ambiguity of strategic nuclear plans is inherent and necessary. It is also a 
strength, since the lack of knowledge of China's nuclear plans on the part of potential adversaries 
compels them to hedge against an array of possible Chinese strategic maneuvers. The CMC, for 
its part, is aware that China cannot match the brunt of an all-out nuclear exchange with the U.S. 
and has correspondingly continued to tailor its deterrent strategy to suit its modest nuclear 
capabilities and to adapt its grand strategy according to Chinese characteristics.[11] However, the 
CMC has security concerns exclusive of those posed by the U.S. that must be addressed in its 
grand strategy.  
China borders more international neighbors than any other nation except Russia. Since WWII 
China's borders have been bloodied: there were wars with India in 1962, the Soviets in 1969, and 
Vietnam in 1979. Therefore, China must factor in its neighbors and especially its NC neighbors 
India, Russia, and Pakistan in addition to the U.S. when formulating its grand strategy.  
Right-sizing China's Nuclear Mix According to Chinese Characteristics  
How has China developed and apportioned its nuclear arsenal to provide the requisite deterrence 
needed to counter its neighboring as well as more distant threats? The 50-page, unclassified, 
Annual Report to Congress of Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006 (Military 
Power) provided details of the U.S. Secretary of Defense's estimated Chinese military intentions 
for the next 20 years. The current number of Chinese CSS-4 ICBMs capable of hitting Alaska, 
Hawaii, and the western U.S. was estimated to be 20.[12] The next generation of ICBMs, the 
road-mobile DF-31 (same range as the CSS-4), and DF-31A with a range of 12,000 kilometer (km) 
can hit targets anywhere on the U.S. mainland.[13] The quantity of Chinese nuclear weapons will 
remain paltry compared to the thousands still maintained in Russian and American stockpiles.[14] 
The CIA estimated that between 2001 and 2015 China may have from 75-100 ICBMs capable of 
striking the United States.[15] China faces a strategic conundrum regarding its nuclear future: 
whether to build massive amounts of new weapons to be on par with Moscow and Washington, or 
to continue to produce nuclear and other weapons at its slow and deliberate pace. China's White 
Paper was clear on that score: "It [China] has never entered into and will never enter into a 
nuclear arms race with any other country."[16] A 2005 Chinese book devoted to coercive 
deterrence warfare notes that the Chinese studied the effects of the Cold War arms race between 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union and surmised that its ultimate result (i.e., the bankruptcy of the 
Soviet economy) was in part caused by the arms race.[17] The 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review footnoted above drew attention to China as the emerging Asian power. China was forced 
to assume that mantle and was put on notice that the U.S. was watching its activities closely. As if 
coming to the defense of China in this matter, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and 
Natural Resources Defense Council published the 250-page Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. 
Nuclear War Planning in November 2006. The Executive Summary stated:  
Estimates about the size of Chinese nuclear arsenal were grossly overstated, sometimes 
by several hundred percent, and timelines for when new systems would come on line 
were almost always too much too soon. The reasons for these misjudgments include 
China's ability to keep its capabilities hidden, a tendency among some U.S. intelligence 
analysts to overstate their conclusions, and the Pentagon's general inclination to assume 
the worst. This predisposition to exaggerate the Chinese threat unfortunately remains 
evident today.[18]  
Beijing immediately seized the opportunity presented by the FAS report's release to unleash a 
wave of public statements in the Party-controlled press concurring with the FAS that the 
Pentagon had exaggerated China's military threat in order to ramp up military spending and force 
China into an arms race. In the 2 December 2006 Beijing China Daily, Deputy Secretary General 
of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Teng Jianquin, said:  
Some people in the United States intend to drag China into an arms race to slow down 
China's economic development, as they did with the former Soviet Union, but I do not 
think China will follow suit.[19, 20]  
The FAS excerpt inversely complements a paper written by Drs. Perry and Carter. The FAS said 
". . . the Pentagon's general inclination to assume the worst,"[21] Perry-Carter, on the other hand, 
wrote that: ". . . the Chinese military leaders . . . will prepare for the worst."[22] Chinese officials 
reiterate and underscore their intent not to become mired in an arms race with the U.S.  
Pursuing this argument, it is known that China has also studied American operations during the 
Gulf Wars and saw how the U.S. was able to mass forces, and when ready, to destroy Iraq's 
massive armor, aircraft, and missile forces in an expeditious and crushing manner. The Chinese 
do not want to relearn Iraq's lessons. How China will apply the Soviet and Iraqi lessons learned in 
formulating its own grand strategy is a mystery to Western observers, or is it? Can a Western 
observer divine the trajectory of Chinese strategic thought by analyzing official, open source 
speeches and writings? Are there hints or outright declarations of Chinese strategic thought 
available to savvy readers, just as low-hanging fruit is available on trees waiting to be plucked? 
Since the Chinese news media are state controlled, all press releases must have the imprimatur 
of the CCP. Therefore a careful culling of articles and books as well as public policy statements 
such as the White Paper will serve as a font of information not available from satellite 
photography or communications intercepts. Just as steganography seeks to hide a message 
within an image or other file; open source Chinese writings may contain confidential, official 
Chinese policies that outsiders can, with due attention, decipher.  
An examination of open source documents on China's grand strategy reveals an intriguing thread 
that weaves its way through the corpus of thought on its grand strategy and the role of nuclear 
weapons within it. The result is, not surprisingly, ambiguity! The Chinese would like us to believe 
that even their leadership has not fully decided which path to pursue. The Science of Military 
Strategy, written by two People's Liberation Army (PLA) MajGens, announced that:  
At the most important position of the strategic structure is China's national strategy. While 
no national strategy has been formally issued so far, its contents are embodied in a 
series of general and specific policies worked out by the Chinese Communist Party and 
Chinese government.[23] (Emphasis added)  
That passage is deliberately vague and leaves outsiders to ponder whence China has gone with 
its strategy, thereby making it difficult to develop possible counter measures.[24]  
William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter, co-directors of the Preventive Defense Project (PDP), 
discussed future Chinese strategies in an article titled "China on the March" in the National 
Interest. The authors opined that: "Since the Chinese military leaders cannot predict the future, 
they will prepare for the worst, even as they hope for the best. Hedging is contagious."[25] 
However, in a one-page letter to their PDP colleagues discussing their article, they observed that:  
China's future "intentions" are not a secret they keep from us, but a mystery that only the 
future will reveal as it is shaped by the next generation of Chinese and their leaders, their 
struggle with rapid growth and openness, and the ever-present possibility of crises over 
Taiwan or other issues.[26]  
With all due respect to Drs. Perry and Carter, however, it is also possible that their perceptions 
have been shaped by clever deceptions (e.g., Sun Tzu said: All warfare is based on deception) 
which were implemented through an intentional Chinese strategic information and deception 
campaign. Denial and deception are integral components of Chinese nuclear strategy. Military 
Power stated that: "Whole departments of military academies teach moulüe, or strategic 
deception, derived from Chinese experience through the millennia."[27]  
"The Inferior Defeats the Superior," "Assassin's Mace," and Fait Accompli 
Chinese leaders know that they cannot defeat the United States in a face-to-face encounter. They 
have studied the results of the Gulf Wars. They also know that the United States, whose forces 
would confront theirs in a face off over Taiwan, would somehow have to be neutralized in a short-
term conflict to achieve the desired results, or face defeat in a long-term conflict. The CMC knows 
that the U.S supply lines are long, that U.S. forces require enormous amounts of fuel and 
ammunition, and that they require intricate communications paths—both terrestrial and space-
borne. This issue received detailed attention in The Science of Military Strategy:  
In regard to information systems, we should firmly destroy their surface facilities, jam and 
cut the enemy's information feedback transmission circuits first, and then try our best to 
knock off his awareness platforms and damage his information flow which can form 
capabilities, so as to achieve the effect of "decapitation."[28]  
Chinese military planners would have to devise a means of interrupting U.S. supplies and 
communications for just as long as it would take for them to seize and occupy Taiwan. The 
Chinese do not want a protracted war, but would like a fait accompli. According to Military Power, 
in order to successfully accomplish their military strategy:  
China's leaders have placed a near-term emphasis on asymmetric programs and 
systems to leverage China's advantages while exploiting the perceived vulnerabilities of 
potential opponents—so-called Assassin's Mace (sha shou jian) programs.[29]  
The Chinese have adapted Sun Tzu's ancient stratagems to today's strategic requirements. In 
this particular case, the doctrine is called "The Inferior Defeats the Superior." Michael Pillsbury 
has culled Chinese open source writings and described the process by which the Chinese will 
implement this assassin's mace program.  
In order to be successful at the doctrine of "The Inferior Defeats the Superior," China 
assumes it can initially lull the opponent into complacency, or deceive him to take steps 
that will help China win. The premises here are quite elaborate . . . These concepts of 
how "The Inferior Defeats the Superior" are claimed to be unique to China, and to have 
[sic] developed by Chinese strategists over thousands of years. For this reason, PLA 
authors employ extensive examples from Chinese ancient military campaigns which they 
claim are the heart of Mao's military doctrines. Westerners are presumed to be ignorant 
of these Chinese "lessons learned" about Assassin's Mace employment concepts and the 
doctrines of "The Inferior Can Defeat the Superior."[30, 31, 32]  
Pillsbury further explains why the Chinese shroud assassin's mace programs in a veil of secrecy:  
. . . some of the doctrines are considered to be highly classified in China, especially as 
they are taught in classified courses in military operations in the senior PLA schools. 
Available open sources thus only hint at the full set of concepts of the Inferior Defeats the 
Superior. Nor do open sources necessarily provide a full set of Assassin's Mace 
Weapons, either. After all, the need to surprise and even paralyze the opponent is an 
explicit goal of both these weapons and this doctrine. It is hardly to be expected that they 
would be fully described for the opponent to read and study in advance.[33]  
Having gained awareness of one of China's assassin's mace concepts and how the Chinese 
leadership has intentionally shrouded it in secrecy, one can better understand that Chinese 
military developments, as seen by Western observers, may indeed only be what the Chinese 
want outside observers to see.  
The Chinese do not try to hide the fact that they have been downsizing the PLA's end strength. 
The most recent troop reductions brought the PLA down to 2.3 million personnel. That figure is 
almost identical to that of the U.S. Armed Forces. It is interesting to note that a country of over 1.3 
billion people has the same number of soldiers as the United States with a population of only 300 
million.  
There are other sweeping changes occurring in China's military. The PLA, PLAN (navy) and 
PLAAF (air force) are undergoing a Chinese version of Goldwaters-Nicols in order to function 
more along the lines of U.S. joint operations.[34] Additionally, the Chinese have coined a term:  
"informationalization" or what the United States calls "command, computers, control, 
communications, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (C 4ISR)." The white 
paper stresses satellite and airborne sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles and information 
warfare.[35]  
The Chinese have been funding these changes by increasing its military budget at a rate of 10 
percent for the past 20 years.[36] This year's defense budget's increase is 18 percent over last 
year's.[37] There is more money for technology while there are fewer troops in the field. 
Second Artillery's Place in China's Strategy  
As the CMC drastically reduces personnel strength[38] while continuously increasing the military 
budget, is it possible for an outsider to perceive any implications for the role of nuclear weapons 
in the grand strategy? The answer to this question would be found in the repository of Chinese 
nuclear weapons, the PLA's Second Artillery Corps (Second Artillery), also known as the 
Strategic Missile Force. Second Artillery operates China's land-based and tactical ballistic 
missiles, strategic nuclear weapons and conventionally armed SRBMs.[39] It is composed of 
100,000 officers, NCOs and conscripts and is the smallest of the various branches and services 
in the PLA's order of battle.[40] Its nuclear inventory is approximately 400 warheads—280 
strategic and 120 tactical.[41]  
It should be noted that being the smallest branch of the PLA, Second Artillery actually increased 
in numbers despite the troop reductions cited above. Second Artillery controls its own budget. 
Additionally, the budget for its nuclear weapons has reportedly been constantly maintained at five 
percent of the overall defense expenditure,[42] which is a not a paltry sum considering that the 
defense spending was estimated to be between $50-80 billion this year.[43]  
What do these well-funded forces contribute to China's defense? According to the White Paper, 
"Second Artillery Force organizes and commands its own troops in case of launching nuclear 
counterattacks with strategic missiles and conducting operations with conventional missiles. 
Under it are missile and training bases, and . . . support troops."[44]  
Evan S. Medeiros noted in Evolving Nuclear Doctrine: "Indeed, the nuclear counterstrike 
campaign is the only nuclear contingency that the PLA leaders has identified for the Second 
Artillery."[45] China's entire nuclear arsenal is estimated at approximately 400 warheads.[46] 
Presently, it is assumed that virtually all operational and deployable warheads in their nuclear 
arsenal are in Second Artillery's hands. Why? The airborne leg of their proto-triad is composed of 
100 B6 BADGER (1965 vintage) and 30 A-5 FANTAN (1970 vintage) aircraft. It is unclear if these 
platforms are still assigned to strategic strike missions.[47] Additionally, the problem-plagued, 
1980s-vintage, XIA-class, (Type 092) SSBN (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine) never 
successfully performed one patrol and, therefore, still does not pose a credible threat. However, 
the White Paper stated that the "Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for 
offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations[48] 
and nuclear counterattacks."[49] Supporting the White Paper, Lt. Gen Mi Zhenyu, senior 
strategist at China's Academy of Military Science wrote: "China's political and economic focus lies 
on the coastal areas [and] for the present and a fairly long period to come, strategic focus will be 
in the direction of the sea."[50] In 2006, the PLAN launched two new JIN-class (Type 094) 
SSBNs that are expected to be deployment-ready by the end of the decade.[51] 
"Improve the Survivability of the Strategic Nuclear Weapons" 
There are other dramatic changes occurring within the Chinese nuclear forces, changes that have 
been on-going for decades at a modest pace. Have the Chinese told outsiders what their strategy 
would be regarding the upgrade of their forces? In 1989, then-deputy commander of the Second 
Artillery, Major General Yang Huan, published a paper on the Defense Industry of China 
informing the world of China's intentions:  
. . . we should improve current weapons to raise the quality and the comprehensive fighting 
capability. Science and technology should be our guideposts. . . strengthening the study of 
single-item high technology weapons. We should work hard on the survival, fast reaction, 
accuracy, and break-through and high-command technologies for weapons systems. These 
should be the direction for the development of our strategic nuclear weapons.  
• Improve the survivability of the strategic nuclear weapons . . .  
We should strengthen research on small, solid fuel and highly automated mobile missiles and 
on the technology of invisibility, for reinforcing defense work against nuclear or nonnuclear 
strike; and improve the survivability of missiles before launch and in flight . . .  
• Improve the striking ability of strategic nuclear weapons . . .  
• Improve the penetration technology of strategic weapons.[52]  
There is seemingly no deception intended in General Yang Huan's words. In fact, he actually 
provided a litany of items on Second Artillery's things to do list. Since his article appeared 18 
years ago, China has been able to introduce road-mobile, strategic, nuclear-tipped ICBMs, the 
DF-31 and the extended-range DF-31A, which may target of most the world, including the 
continental United States.[53] These missiles are solid-propellant—a major improvement over the 
previous liquid-fueled missiles. Another significance of that upgrade is that China's ICBMs are no 
longer confined to silos. Additionally, launch times have been reduced from several hours to 
minutes, since there is no requirement to fuel the missiles immediately prior to launch with highly-
corrosive, liquid rocket fuel.[54] It is obvious that making nuclear ICBMs solid fueled and road-
mobile tremendously increased their survivability. Another open source document in the 
Liberation Army Daily from 30 May 2001 praised the then-new Russian road-mobile ICBM calling 
it an assassin's mace weapon: '". . . that could ensure "the most reliable" nuclear retaliation."'[55]  
As mentioned above, the sea-based leg of their triad has also been upgraded with the addition of 
the JIN-class SSBNs, which will carry the naval version of the DF-31—the JL-2 SLBM. The XIA 
SSBN was designed to carry 12 JL-1 SLBMs and the JIN was designed to carry 16 JL-2 
missiles.[56] The addition of the nuclear-powered JINs armed with nuclear-tipped SLBMs will 
provide the CMC with an additional, survivable nuclear option in its grand strategy.[57]  
A review of the items on General Yang Huan's list mentioned above shows that many of those 
items have been acquired: they have improved current weapons to raise the quality and the 
comprehensive fighting capability, they have improved the survivability of strategic nuclear 
weapons, and they have obtained small, solid fuel and highly automated mobile missiles. One 
hears on TV commercials: Yang Huan also called for improving the striking ability of strategic 
nuclear weapons as well as improving the penetration technology of strategic weapons. In this 
case, the Chinese are waiting to see how effective the U.S. national missile defense (NMD)[58] 
system will be. As discussed in the hedging strategies above, the Chinese will not be able to 
design countermeasures for the NMD system until they (and the United States as well) know if it 
will really work. According to Saunders:  
Chinese responses to BMD could consist of three categories of programs: expansion of 
China's current BM forces, technical countermeasures to penetrate and defeat U.S. BMD 
system, and the possible use of asymmetric measures such as the development of ASAT 
weapons to attack key components of the U.S. system.[59]  
The Chinese have proven themselves to be capable of creating and deploying military technology 
without the advanced knowledge of foreign intelligence services. For example, Bill Gertz wrote 
about China's Yuan-class submarine that was built secretly and completely underground.[60] 
China also fired a warning shot across the bow of countries possessing space-based intelligence 
satellites by successfully destroying an old Chinese weather satellite with an ASAT.[61] If the 
Chinese can successfully hide the construction of a submarine, successfully launch its ASAT, and 
deploy road-mobile ICBMs with miniaturized warheads, can they develop other assassin's mace 
weapons without their adversaries' knowledge?[62] An affirmative answer would suggest that 
hedging will also continue on all sides, since no side can be certain of what the other side is doing 
and, therefore, cannot base its security on the belief that it knows everything that the other side 
might do to improve its relative position.  
No First Use—Three Cases of Non-applicability  
Having presented the nuclear components now at the disposal of the CMC, what strategy have 
they developed, and are currently employing, to protect their national sovereignty and dignity? 
The Chinese and the United States as well know that China possesses a limited amount of 
nuclear weapons. They must not only attempt to deter attacks on Chinese territory, but must also 
be prepared to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan, if that contingency presents itself. The strategy 
previously mentioned, "The Inferior Defeats the Superior," is their game plan for defeating the 
United States in a short-term, limited conflict in which the employment of nuclear weapons is not 
excluded.[63] To achieve success in this scenario they must adapt Sun Tzu's stratagems to 
today's battlefield and diplomatic conditions. In their open source writings, they have already 
provided precise information on their intentions. Has the United States been paying sufficient 
attention to their rhetoric? Despite myriad public announcements, the Chinese have nonetheless 
indicated that nuclear weapons may play a role in their grand strategy; even if they are not 
attacked first. The White Paper reiterated their long-standing pledge:  
China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any 
time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, 
and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear 
weapons.[64]  
Numerous documents indicate that future Chinese actions may belie their words regarding No 
First Use. There are three cases worthy of closer scrutiny:  
1. The Case of Taiwan.  
2. The Case of Retaking Disputed Chinese Territory (India and Taiwan).  
3. The Case of Taking a Tactical First Strike after Strategic/Political First Strikes has been 
made by an Adversary.  
The Case of Taiwan 
China does not consider Taiwan to be a foreign country, but rather a renegade province. In his 
address to the U.S. Army War College in 1997, LTG Li Jijun, vice president the PLA's Academy 
of Military Science, stressed  
The Taiwan issue is an internal Chinese affair to which the People's Republic of China 
favors a peaceful solution through reunification. But China cannot commit itself to the 
renouncement of the use of force as a final resort to halt foreign intervention or the 
independence of Taiwan. Therefore, force is also the guarantee that the Taiwan issue 
might be resolved peacefully. For the Chinese government and people issues concerning 
our national sovereignty are not subject to reconciliation or negotiation.[65]  
In fact, numerous Chinese officials have clearly stated NFU is off the table in this case. For 
example, Sha Zukang, a former chief PRC arms control official within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs stated that: "the Chinese promise of 'no-first-use' is not applicable to Taiwan as Taiwan is 
a national territory of China."[66] Other statements include a PRC official discussing nuclear 
retaliation over Taiwan during the 1996 crisis, stating that U.S. leaders ". . . care more about Los 
Angeles than Taiwan."[67] In 2005, Chinese General Zhu Chenghu also suggested that China 
might use nuclear weapons against the United States in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.[68] 
China has a nuclear assassin's mace weapon tailor-made for employment against Taiwan—its 
neutron bomb, tested in 1988. "This weapon would be ideally suited for use against Taiwan 
because the neutron effects kill people and leave the surroundings unharmed."[69] Chinese 
analysts have reportedly considered how to employ neutron weapons against Taiwan while 
keeping the United States strategically deterred from interfering in the conflict.[70] Such 
statements clearly indicate that China does not consider the principle of NFU applicable to 
Taiwan. Has this message been received clearly in Washington? The authors of The Science of 
Military Strategy stress that the  
Taiwan issue is the largest and the last obstacle which we must conquer in [the] Chinese 
people's path to rejuvenation in [the] 21st century, and it is by all means the most 
important in our national security strategy in this century.[71]  
The Chinese are officially telling the world that their top national security strategy priority is 
Taiwan. This is an example of China's strategic signaling to the Pentagon.  
The Case of Retaking Disputed Chinese Territory (India and Taiwan) 
As previously presented, China has several on-going border disputes. Would China's NFU apply 
in the case of a flare up over disputed territory? Retired Indian Brigadier Vijai K Nair is convinced 
that the answer is no. According to Nair:  
This is because Beijing, while insisting that its nuclear weapons are exclusively 
"defensive" in nature and focused only on deterring the possibility of nuclear coercion by 
other NWS's, has an added proviso that nuclear weapons have a role in preserving its 
sovereign territorial integrity, thereby extending their use in any military operation it may 
launch to wrest the territory it claims from India.[72]  
As stated previously, the Sino-Indian War occurred in 1962 and China did not test its nuclear 
weapon until 1964, so there has been no real test of the so-called proviso. However, Nair 
continued:  
Given these strategic parameters it is important to appreciate the developing nature and 
capabilities of China's Armed Forces and their potential to achieve and maintain China's 
national security interests. The military structure in China is divided into two broad 
categories—conventional and strategic nuclear forces—with present day dependence on 
the former as the nuclear force structure continues to evolve into a viable policy 
instrument.[73]  
China's grand strategy, therefore, must also factor in border disputes. Its nuclear inventory 
includes 300-350 CSS-6 SRBMs (short-range ballistic missiles) with a range of 200-600 km. The 
CSS-6 carries a 10-20 kilo ton nuclear warhead.[74] As in the case of Taiwan, the CMC must 
consider not only the political results of using nuclear weapons on its borders, but also the 
physical effects that would be generated by a nuclear blast. What benefit is gained by destroying 
one's own territory to keep it out of the unfriendly hands, other than maintaining national dignity 
and honor?[75] The Chinese may also elect to use assassin's mace technologies (e.g., neutron 
bombs) in such a scenario. Another point that the CMC might make in this case is that if Taiwan 
would be occupied by U.S. defenders, Taiwan, ergo, would become disputed territory as well, and 
thereby subject to internal Chinese, and not external NFU rules.  
The Case of Taking a Tactical First Strike after Strategic/Political First 
Strikes have been Made by an Adversary 
This case exudes Sun Tzu's application of stratagem and deception. What message do the 
Chinese authors really mean to convey? The wording is quite vague. Are they revealing their 
intention to perform a tactical first strike (a euphemism for first use?) in response to a perceived 
political/strategic first strike by the adversary? Such was the logic behind China's so-called 
"retaliatory invasion" of Vietnam in 1979. The Science of Military Strategy states:  
Under high-tech conditions, for the defensive side, the strategy to gain mastery by 
striking only after the enemy has struck does not mean waiting for enemy's strike 
passively. 'Striking only after the enemy has struck' in strategy is based on the 'victory in 
advance' of comprehensive national defense construction. It is the means to win political 
and moral initiatives. . . 'the first shot' on the plane of politics and strategy must be 
differentiated from 'the first shot' on the plane of tactics. . . if any country or organization 
violates the other country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the other side will have the 
right to 'fire the first shot' on the plane of tactics. The military counterattacks may be 
taken by the following options: to drive the invaders out of the territory; or to launch the 
same attacks on the enemy's homeland; or to attack the enemy's foreign military bases, 
targets at sea or in the air.[76]  
There are far greater and graver ramifications emanating from this rather obtuse passage. If the 
Chinese actually consider conducting first strikes, or as termed in the passage "counterattacks" 
(possibly with nuclear weapons),[77] U.S. forces would be at risk. The passage says that they 
would attack ". . . the enemy's foreign military bases." That could entail violating their negative 
security assurances also, since the only applicable U.S. bases in the region are located in non-
NC countries Japan and South Korea.[78] The intent of the Chinese passage begs further 
intensive discussion. Have the Chinese tipped their hand by revealing their thinking on first 
(nuclear) strike and other topics?[79] In addition to this layer of possible deception, the reader 
must understand that what the Chinese say may not be what will actually be done in a crisis. It is 
not in China's national interest for its adversaries to know their grand strategy and the role of 
nuclear weapons in it. Open source documents provide a treasure trove of information to the 
careful reader.[80]  
Coercive Deterrence  
Having presented three cases in which the CMC may consider abrogating its NFU pledge, the 
composition of their nuclear deterrent forces must be considered to understand the current and 
possible future trajectory of their grand strategy. The discussion above showed that China 
possesses a modest nuclear arsenal compared to those of the United States and Russia, 
although to put things in proper perspective, the Chinese may boast the world's third largest 
inventory of nuclear weapons. The CMC knows that it cannot beat the United States in an all out 
nuclear exchange. However, China's leaders have thought about how to successfully defeat the 
United States in their "The Inferior Defeats the Superior" strategy.[81] They explain details of their 
strategy in Coercive Deterrence as they list their weaknesses and strengths: "the operational 
radius of the Chinese aviation force is limited, and the Navy does not have big carriers . . . a 
missile weapon force . . . with strong defense capability and wide range flexible firepower, plays a 
crucial military deterrence role."[82] The Coercive Deterrence authors state that: "Military 
deterrence by missile forces is a confrontation of strength and determination, as well as a contest 
of stratagem and wisdom."[83] They stress the virtues of denial and deception:  
First, combine "keeping" and "leaking" secrets to let the other side know that we have 
strong deterrence forces, but not the specific real situation of our forces. Secondly, 
reasonably arrange the deployment of the real and unreal forces by placing the real 
forces in false forces and vice versa, and mixing the real and false forces, as well as 
blending true and false targets, true and false positions, true and false intelligence, and 
true and false action so that the enemy will have a hard time to make decision and out 
[sic, NB: probably a typo and should be: our] side will achieve the effect of "winning by 
deterrence."[84]  
Alastair Johnston focused on the "Chineseness" of China's deterrence strategy based on 
minimalism, ambiguity, flexibility and patience.[85] The Chinese have attempted to hide their 
weaknesses while they have flaunted their strengths. This demonstrates Sun Tzu's arts of war in 
action.[86]  
China's military position vis-à-vis the United States' overwhelming preponderance of power is 
indeed precarious. One could argue that China had no choice but to develop such a strategy. 
Stephen M. Walt cited a PRC official's lament regarding America's might: "How can we base our 
national security on your assurances of goodwill?"[87] That particular Chinese official, one would 
assume, was familiar with Sun Tzu's teachings, and had based his comment on them on Sun 
Tzu's admonition not to leave one's fate in the hands of the enemy. Straying only briefly from the 
realm of nuclear weapons, it should be noted that Chinese leaders are also examining 
complementary technologies that could be brought to bear in a crisis to further weaken an 
adversary, albeit if only temporarily. Unrestricted Warfare was written by two Chinese senior 
colonels in 1999. In addition to assassin's mace weapons, these PLA officers also discussed 
using information warfare against adversaries. Devastating results could be achieved though 
cyber warfare. They wrote that:  
With technological developments being in the process of striving to increase the types of 
weapons, a breakthrough in our thinking can open up the domain of the weapons 
kingdom at one stroke. As we see it, a single man-made stock-market crash, a single 
computer virus invasion, or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the 
enemy country's exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the 
Internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept weapons.[88]  
That the CMC is pursuing myriad paths directed at confounding possible U.S. actions is clearly 
shown in open source documents. The Chinese are also examining ways of defeating the U.S. 
NMD system as previously discussed. According to Brigadier Nair, it is:  
. . . China's aim to project itself as being equal with the United States to preclude the 
possibility of intrusive diplomacy through nuclear coercion. While China is not on par with 
the United States, its leadership does have a meaningful deterrent at its disposal and 
continues to expand this power base without let up.[89]  
Other authors echo Nair's thoughts. For example, Willner and Bolt write:  
China's priority in the near term will be on building a more survivable force, one less 
vulnerable to first strike and one that maintains a secure second strike capability. While 
continuing to cloak its efforts in secrecy and ambiguity, China's nuclear planners want to 
build a modern force designed to deter and prevent potential nuclear adversaries from 
coercing Beijing in a crisis. Indeed the buildup is aimed . . . not only to survive but to win 
a limited war.[90]  
The Chinese Gambit  
The limited war would, one assumes, be fought over Taiwan. This is where the flashpoint would 
be in a Sino-U.S. confrontation. Numerous Chinese articles describe how they would locate U.S. 
aircraft carriers.[91] Pillsbury cited Chinese research on using Over the Horizon radar (OTH) to 
initially locate carriers, called "slowly moving objects" in the article, and then employs the 
precision tracking systems mentioned above to prosecute them.[92] The Chinese have studied 
the possibility of attacking U.S. carriers while they are still 2,000 or more kilometers from Taiwan. 
If they can succeed in locating the carriers far from Taiwan using the combined OTH, and long-
range surveillance platforms, and then employ precision-guided missiles or cruise missiles to 
destroy them, the United States would have an extremely complicated task in repelling an 
invasion of Taiwan.[93] This would be another example of assassin's mace technology 
applied.[94] The Chinese missiles attacking the carrier strike group could be nuclear-tipped 
according to the cases and documents cited above. Simultaneously, China's new JIN-class 
SSBNs could be lurking within firing range of mainland U.S. targets, while U.S. foreign bases in 
Japan and Korea would be well within range of Chinese land-based missiles. If the Chinese 
struck the carriers and rapidly invaded Taiwan, would the United States opt to retaliate against 
Chinese targets? If so, would the United States deem that strikes on mainland China would offset 
Chinese attacks on Los Angeles? Would the U.S. NMD shield successfully intercept the Chinese 
SLBMs? Would the United States take that chance? Such decisions would be the crux of the 
matter, and the key to the China's Inferior Defeats the Superior strategy. In 1997, General Liu 
Jingsong advocated the Inferior Defeats the Superior strategy of using first strikes, attacks on 
carriers, assassin's mace weapons, and the benefits of rapid and decisive actions.[95] A credible 
Chinese deterrent would exist (i.e., would the United States want to trade Los Angeles for Taipei). 
The Chinese gambit might succeed indeed.[96]  
Future Trends  
The Chinese could further confuse the issue prior to any hostile acts by following Russia's lead 
regarding NFU. Russia abandoned its NFU pledge when NATO expanded to its borders.[97] 
Moreover, Chapter 7 "Adapting U.S. Strategic Forces" of the Annual Report of the Secretary of 
Defense to the President and Congress, 2002, an unclassified summary of the January 2002 
Nuclear Posture Review:  
concluded that deterrence should not be limited to the threat of retaliation, nor rely 
exclusively on nuclear forces. . . Replace the Strategic Triad of the Cold War with a New 
Triad that integrates conventional and nuclear offensive strategic strike capabilities, 
active and passive defenses, and a responsive infrastructure to provide a more diverse 
portfolio of capabilities against immediate, potential and unforeseen contingencies.[98]  
In essence, China as well as others was put on notice that the United States too would no longer 
follow a no first use policy, and could employ small nuclear weapons as well as its new and highly 
accurate guided conventional missiles.[99]  
Therefore, if China would follow the Russian and American moves and formally abolish NFU, its 
deterrence posture would become more ambiguous and menacing. Perhaps that is why China 
has been dropping those not-so-subtle hints at NFU's inapplicability to Taiwan, to the disputed 
territories, and to the first tactical strikes—the aforementioned three cases. However, as long as 
China continues to adhere to NFU, it does retain the moral 'high ground' on this issue. The CMC 
must decide which path to follow and when to change course. There seems to be no reason for 
China to abandon its NFU policy. Again, what China says for public consumption and propaganda 
value may not be what China does when forced to decide when to employ "counterattacks."  
Do Beijing's planners actually believe that The Inferior Defeats the Superior strategy would work? 
In a best case scenario, it would play out exactly as planned for China, and its invasion scenario 
of Taiwan would become a fait accompli.[100] The U.S. would not fire a shot.[101] The role of 
nuclear weapons in China's grand strategy would have been proven to be sufficient to accomplish 
its limited and modest requirements. Sun Tzu's aphorisms "If you know the enemy and know 
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles," and "Hence to fight and conquer in all 
your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy's 
resistance without fighting."[102] In 1994, 11 years prior to the publication of Coercive Deterrence 
and 2,544 or so years after The Art of War appeared, Senior Colonel Shen Kuiguan, professor at 
the PLA Air Force Command Institute in Beijing, described the basic concept of Inferior Defeats 
the Superior strategy.  
Usually, certain internal structures, certain parts or links of the superior side may be 
comparatively weak, and with the inferior side, there may also be some aspect or links 
which it has an advantage that is missing in the other side. To attack the weak part of the 
enemy with our strong force will undoubtedly result in victory.[103]  
However, another consideration that the Chinese strategic planners must consider is that 
improvements in U.S. weapons accuracy make conventional weapons just as destructive as 
small-yield nuclear weapons. The Chinese are aware that U.S. nuclear weapons engineers are 
designing deep-penetration weapons that will be capable of destroying deep underground 
bunkers and other hardened facilities.[104] The CMC faces quite a daunting task—to create a 
grand strategy capable of countering the ever-changing threats posed by U.S. advances in 
technology. Even if the Chinese could leapfrog forward, they would not be able to leap far enough 
to surmount the technological obstacles being placed in their path by the Pentagon.[105] For 
example, if the U.S. NMD system is successfully deployed along with its affiliated Theater Missile 
Defense (TMD) systems in Asia, the Chinese ability to launch "counterattack" strikes (implying 
that first strikes have already been made in the strategic and diplomatic realms) would be 
severely at risk. Also, with precision-guided conventional missiles, the United States could launch 
non-nuclear strikes and neutralize Chinese missiles in their silos and on their launchers. The 
Chinese, even if they wished, would not be able to successfully respond for the two reasons just 
given—the first, because of the NMD/TMD shields, and second, because the Chinese missiles 
would be destroyed on the ground. Additionally, the Chinese do not have an adequate early 
warning system capable of detecting inbound missiles and warheads.[106] Such an early warning 
system would entail great expense if the Chinese elect to pursue that goal.  
Perhaps the authors of The Science of Military Strategy did state the truth that ". . . no national 
strategy has been formally issued so far." Their target strategy (i.e., to deter the U.S) has proved 
to be far too elusive for any single strategy, requiring that a comprehensive strategy be 
formulated. They seem to be pacing their nuclear weapons advances with the deployment of the 
U.S. NMD system. Advances in the Pentagon's "assassin's mace" weapons are outpacing theirs. 
Brigadier Nair noted that:  
China is extremely sensitive to the nuclear disposition of potential opponents. Russia and 
the United States are eons ahead in the nuclear arms race and no amount of arms 
limitation accords are likely to alter that equation appreciably for quite some time.[107]  
Chinese Diplomatic and Technological Maneuvers  
As stated in the White Paper, the Chinese do not want to get ensnared in a costly and possibly 
destructive arms race. By acceding to arms control treaties, the Chinese may have hoped that 
such international regimes might somehow slow down U.S. technological advances. The Chinese, 
however, were dismayed when the G. W. Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty in 2002, and when the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.[108] The great writing on the wall for the CMC concerning the U.S. stance on nuclear 
weapons was clear—any attempt to reach parity with the United States was simply impossible; 
trying to keep pace with the United States advances was the only viable, albeit perhaps also futile, 
approach.  
Numerically modest, the Chinese nuclear deterrent force could be neutralized by U.S. missiles in 
their silos as well as on their mobile launchers. However, if the Chinese could launch their 
missiles on warning or while under attack, they might, at least, have a chance of impacting their 
targets. That topic again raises the question of the reliability and accuracy of the U.S. and Allied 
NMD/TMD shields.  
How are the Chinese planning to defend against or defeat this threat to their "retaliatory" 
strikes?[109] They are hoping that the U.S. NMD will fail and, therefore, will have cost the United 
States billions of dollars with not a pound of defense gained.[110] Hope, unfortunately, is not a 
strategy that Sun Tzu mentions in his writings. Chinese officials have discussed ways of defeating 
the NMD by adding many more missiles to their inventory,[111] by adding multiple independently 
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), by using decoys and chaff, by improving C 4ISR (called 
informationalization by the Chinese), by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generating weapons,[112, 
113] and other counter measures.[114]  
Coercive Deterrence faintly alluded to China's interest in developing its own BMD. 
Currently, countries such as the United States, Russia, and Israel have rapid 
development of anti-missile defense systems, possessing a certain degree of missile 
intercepting capability. China is at the beginning stage. The TMD, NMD missile defense 
system built by the United States in the future will have very strong deterrence effect.[115] 
(Emphasis added.)  
What did the authors of Coercive Deterrence imply by that terse statement? Is China is at the 
beginning stage of NMD/TMD? Will they again look to their usual source of inspiration and 
assassin's mace technology— Russia? A BMD system would require an early warning system, as 
previously mentioned. It would also require interceptor missiles. Will the Chinese elect to deploy 
nuclear-tipped ABM interceptors to defend key sites such as Beijing and the ICBMs silos and 
mobile launchers? The U.S. had such a system in the 1960s, and Russia's ABM-Treaty approved 
interceptor sites are still situated along Moscow's ring road.[116] The development of a Chinese 
ABM system would give the CMC some assurance that its ICBMs might survive an attack, but 
would in no way assure that, if launched, they would successfully strike their targets, since they 
would have to penetrate the U.S. NMD shield. An ABM system protects existing assets and is 
defensive in nature. The Chinese have also said that they can improve missile survivability by 
adding more and improved missiles to the inventory—thinking that there is safety in numbers, that 
is, the more missiles inbound against U.S. targets the more stress on the NMD).  
The modernization of the China's strategic missile forces improves the CMC's nuclear strategy, 
even if no more missiles are added. Brad Roberts contended that:  
China's force will grow more capable even if it does not increase numerically. The future 
force will be more alert (because the warheads will travel with mobile systems), better 
able to survive preemptive attack, more capable of launch under attack, more accurate , 
more capable of penetrating or overwhelming U.S. defenses, and more threatening to 
U.S. allies in the region.[117]  
China's Trajectory  
China's gradual acquisition of new as well as an overall modernization of existing weapons 
systems is in keeping with its grand strategy, or what can be assumed to be called its grand 
strategy (While no national strategy has been formally issued so far its contents are embodied in 
a series of general and specific policies worked out by the Chinese Communist Party and 
Chinese government).[118] The precise trajectory of Chinese military nuclear expansion will be 
known only to Beijing and leaves much room for interpretation, however, the trends are clear—
keeping pace with U.S. advances in myriad areas of technology. The Science of Military Strategy 
gave an example of how precision guided weaponry (visible light, infrared, microwave, millimeter 
wave and lasers) can all be jammed.[119] U.S. weapons systems rely heavily on such technology. 
Pillsbury observed that at a 1997 arms bazaar in the United Arab Emirates, the Chinese 
exhibitors were selling false laser target generators to counter U.S. precision strike weapons 
systems.[120] It is clear that the Chinese are targeting specific U.S. systems as well as taking 
measures to avoid overhead satellite reconnaissance of their actions.[121] These actions reflect 
Sun Tzu's use of stealth, and denial and deception to keep the adversary unaware of one's 
intentions and actions.  
Such actions reinforce China's ability to maneuver without being seen in order to strike. Referring 
to the discussion of Taiwan above, The Science of Military Strategy admonished its readers:  
Adhering to active strategic counterattack on exterior lines, we should do all we can to 
dominate the enemy by striking first. Once the enemy invades our territory and offends 
our national interests, it means that the enemy has already fired the first shot strategically 
and crossed the border of our strategic defense. Then, we get the freedom to conduct 
self-defense operations. As long as the battlefield is concerned, we should not passively 
fight against the enemy in our border regions, coastal regions and related air space. On 
the contrary, after the launching of the war, we should try our best to fight against the 
enemy as far away as possible, to lead the war to enemy's operational base, even to his 
source of war, and to actively strike all the effective strength forming the enemy's war 
system.[122]  
These comments could be interpreted to mean that the Chinese NFU policy has been abandoned 
due to the perception that its territory had already been violated. If such would be so, then that 
policy seems to conflict with Chinese policy as perceived by Mark Stokes.  
The PRC's strategic nuclear doctrine is based on the concept of limited deterrence—the 
ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy in a retaliatory strike. China's nuclear 
forces generally are believed to follow a countervalue strategy that targets population 
centers. China has sufficient nuclear weapons to hold approximately 15-20 million U.S. 
citizens at risk, or about 5-10 percent to the total U.S. population.[123] 
Perhaps the disparity is intentional: the CMC is sending vague signals to purposely confuse 
potential adversaries in order to weaken their options while simultaneously strengthening China's 
options. To further complicate this already muddled topic, Pillsbury referenced the January 2000 
issue of China's Military Digest featuring an article on deterrence highlighting that "limited and 
effective nuclear strikes can be Assassin's Mace weapons to contain the enemy."[124] The 
undergirding themes of the Chinese grand strategy resonated in General Yang Huan's writings.  
In an era when space technology is developing rapidly and a defense system with many 
methods and many layers is appearing, we should pay special attention to the study of 
break-through technology. To sum up, we conclude that the development of strategic 
nuclear weapons is one main aspect in strengthening national defense and is an 
important symbol of modernization of our military. In future development, the advanced 
qualities of strategic weapons will rely to a large degree on the development of the high 
technology and reflect the comprehensive power of a country. . . We should strive to build 
a small in number but effective strategic missile corps with Chinese 
characteristics . . .[125]  
The Chinese have done what was addressed in the Second Artillery's deputy commander's 
proposals. China is improving its military and military-related systems non-stop. The CMC does 
not want to sacrifice economic advancement to an arms race and thereby jeopardize China's 
comprehensive national power, but has continued to robustly fund the PLA. China has acquired 
modern technologies through indigenous production, reverse engineering, direct purchase, 
intelligence collection and theft (spying); all in keeping with Sun Tzu's teachings.[126, 127] 
However, such actions still cannot overcome its position of relative inferiority vis-à-vis the United 
States Pillsbury culled the following from Chinese assessments of their military posture.  
Several premises support the new strategy to develop Assassin's Mace weapons and to 
conduct future conflicts employing the doctrine of "The Inferior Defeats the Superior." 
Most importantly, there is a political-military premise behind this strategy. Its success 
depends on correct and detailed assessments of the opponent's weakest points and the 
best means to surprise and to shock him into paralysis [sic] the powerful opponent. The 
selection and design of Assassin's Mace weapons also depend on correct intelligence 
assessments of the opponent's most vital vulnerabilities, his "acupuncture points."[128]  
China does not willingly reveal its weaknesses, but it does announce its strengths in order to 
maximize the gains achieved from the actions described above. China will also attempt to place 
pressure upon the enemy's perceived weak points to gain advantage.  
If the CMC itself has not fully articulated its overall Grand Strategy internally, Western observers 
then can only speculate externally on what strategy the CMC is following—especially since the 
CMC is reportedly not following any agreed-upon strategy! The absence of knowledge of a 
Chinese strategy would leave U.S planners with the onerous duty of hedging against the worst 
possible strategy that could be adopted by the Chinese.[129] Such hedging could lead the United 
States in a direction convergent with the Chinese strategy. However, if the trajectories diverge, 
the United States could hedge in a completely opposite direction. In the latter case, U.S. planners 
could be confronted with a scenario for which they were completely unprepared. These scenarios 
would position the United States precisely where the Chinese stratagem of the "Inferior Defeats 
the Superior" intended it to be—off guard and off balance and perfectly positioned for swift and 
decisive assassin's mace strike.  
Conclusions  
This paper has surveyed current, open source materials on the role of nuclear weapons in 
China's grand strategy, and has discussed how the writings of Sun Tzu have informed that 
strategy. In recent wars China has picked its battles carefully, again reflecting Sun Tzu's 
teachings.[130] The CMC has woven Sun Tzu's thoughts into its grand strategy. The authors of 
The Science of Military Strategy quoted Sun Tzu in summing up the essence of their strategy: 
'"For enhancing the credibility of deterrence, one should have a well-defined objective in mind 
and "attack what the enemy is bound to save."'[131] That passage is a clear reference to their 
Inferior Defeats the Superior doctrine; included in which is the gambit of trading an American city, 
such as Los Angeles, for Taiwan in order to cause the United States to submit even before shots 
are fired. Open source writings are replete with Chinese pronouncements about and allusions to 
the role of nuclear weapons in their grand strategy. The CMC closely guards the secret details of 
its grand strategy. Perhaps, and as stated in their writings, no grand strategy has yet been 
officially agreed upon by the CMC. In any case, focused intelligence collection as well as careful 
analysis of Chinese open source materials is required to ascertain the trajectory of Chinese 
military progress, especially in regards to how it is pacing and attempting to leap frog U.S. NMD 
and other advancements. The U.S., too, cannot base its security on the assurances of others, 
and therefore, must continue to seek answers to its questions on the trajectory of China's Grand 
Strategy. 
The contents of this paper reflect the author's own personal views and are not necessarily 
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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